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What kind of frame of mind could bring about
sustainability?
What is a frame of mind? In ordinary language, I would suggest that we use the
term in one of two ways: to refer either to a mood (“She’s not in a good frame of
mind today”), or to something more enduring, something like a disposition. The
term also brings to mind some ideas from philosophical and social-psychological
literature that I shall consider later.
Given that the term sustainability is, and always will be, a problematic one
(since it clearly does not imply that we shall all live forever), whatever “it” is
cannot be brought about by a simple policy fix. Clearly, educators and others
must address the ways in which we interact with our environments as sentient
and reasoning human beings if, as a species, we are to stand a better chance of
thriving, along with other species, on this planet.
Some might object that a frame of mind as a mood, therefore, is just not
sufficient. After all, moods come and go, so cannot, by definition, be sustainable
themselves. I shall argue that at the most fundamental level, human beings are
probably incapable of adopting a radically different frame of mind. Although
frames of mind defined as cultural constructs are open to change, they are
not much amenable to conscious manipulation. On the other hand, certain
experiences can help to induce moods which, though temporary, taken all-in-all
can stimulate our love and care for the natural world. This was definitely the
case for William Wordsworth, when he wrote in, I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud:
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For oft when on my couch I lie¡br/¿ In vacant or in pensive mood¡br/¿
They flash upon that inward eye¡br/¿ Which is the bliss of solitude.
Wordsworth is here describing a mood, but one to treasure, and from which he
derives (as he makes clear in many other poems) significant personal and ethical
guidance. When moods become habitual, as seems certainly to have been the
case with Wordsworth, they also tend to become dispositions.
I would argue, then, that education for sustainability should, in part, be con-
cerned with enabling the kinds of experience that promote the kind of mood
Wordsworth describes. This is, of course, by no means easy; after all, Wordsworth
ascribed his own love of nature to an often solitary rural childhood coupled with
a naturally sensitive disposition. I shall return to the challenges for educators
in providing appropriate experiences below.
If a frame of mind is more than just a mood, then the term must refer to some
more enduring organizational structure for thinking and feeling. Framing, thus
understood, has many, vaguely related connotations in various literatures, but
all of them seem to relate to categorizations and definitions determined, to some
degree, by human agency. Thus, when I think of Frames, I am reminded of the
Kantian definition of the Category, of Wittgensteinian “language games,” of
Erving Goffman’s “Frame Analysis,” and, more broadly, of genres, disciplines,
ways of thinking, even communities of practice; also, of course, of art, photog-
raphy, and film. Dispositions relate to tendencies to respond in certain ways
within these frames, or to utilise certain frames rather than others, depend-
ing on the definition used. Regarding educational processes, I am reminded of
Bernstein’s distinction between Weak and Strong Framing and Classification,
and the need for teachers to frame things more strongly for children from certain
backgrounds than for others.
Of course, “determined by human agency” does not imply conscious control.
Paul Guyer1 defines Kant’s Categories broadly as “those general concepts by
means of which our intuitions are converted into representations of objects or
judgments.” Although our intuitions, thus conceived, relate to an absolute re-
ality, bound by time and space, the Categories function prior to our conscious
judgments despite being essentially human constructs (and common to all hu-
manity, according to Kant — though not to all sentient life). What Kant does
not give much consideration to is the degree of possible variation in how judg-
ments can be made. Put simply, how much might the same frame of mind allow
for different arguments and approaches? A belief in cause and effect, for in-
stance, can be enacted very differently in positivist and post-positivist research
paradigms in the social sciences.
Some of this is also true in a sense of the Wittgensteinian language game:2
truths are constructed from within language games, even though there is no
good reason to suppose that the games/frames exist anywhere other than in the
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human psyche.
Millennial global politics, as recent events have all too starkly reminded us,
bear witness to the huge differences between perspectives and dispositions at
the cultural and religious levels. We may all operate within the same Kantian
Categories — even the same Wittgensteinian language games — but the world-
views we construct can still be radically different. Even within the Christian
community (to take a currently relatively uncontroversial example) there are
stark differences between liberals who interpret the Bible according to cultural
context, evangelicals, who interpret the contemporary context according to the
Bible, and fundamentalists, who use the Bible to keep their distance from the
modern world as entirely as possible. Looked at this way, language games can
certainly be played very differently, and we do not necessarily need a new frame
of mind.
Goffman’s social-psychological account construes frames as indeed dependent on
social and cultural change.3 He sees frames as something like spectacles, or the
selective focusing of a camera lens. To see life through rose-coloured spectacles
implies the adoption of particular — in this case, overoptimistic — assumptions
about spatial and temporal context. Goffman’s frames enable us to read events
as appropriate or otherwise within their contexts (and to Goffman, context is
all important), thus allowing us, for example, to be unsurprised when a naked
person enters the room and sits before us in a life-drawing class, though less
composed in the unlikely event that this should happen under other everyday
circumstances. (My example, not Goffman’s.) Goffman’s frames are thus heav-
ily culturally determined. Goffman also differs from Kant, and perhaps from
Wittgenstein, in his view of the relative teachability of frames. In his discus-
sion of “breaking frames” through bursting into laughter, Goffman refers to
the sense of absurdity that recalcitrant youths often feel when their elders and
betters ask them to undertake role plays designed to teach them life skills. A
simple example arises from the experience of many of us who have been involved
in the upbringing of children: it seems ridiculous to say “please” and “thank
you” if you have not been taught to do so habitually. Goffman’s frames, there-
fore, seem less fundamental than Kant’s Categories, or Wittgenstein’s language
games; nevertheless, this does not imply that new frames are created at will.
However, Goffman’s analysis does seem to leave the educator with some room
for manoeuvre, at least with respect to prioritization.
Basil Bernstein4 has perhaps done most to highlight the pedagogical importance
of framing, pointing out that schooling at the end of the twentieth century, at
least in Britain and countries like it, tended to reproduce the cultural norms
and practices of the socially privileged, with well-meaning liberal teachers mis-
guidedly tending to use weak framing and classification in classrooms, whether
or not their students shared their preconceptions about how to “play the game”
of schooling. Bernstein’s account, taken all in all, is essentially sociological and
structural, and more deterministic than Goffman’s, with cultural practices di-
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vided along social class lines in relation to Codes that embody both work and
domestic practices and are expressed via language and schooling. Thus, for a va-
riety of reasons, working-class children tend to grow up in homes where questions
are not invited and feelings are little articulated, where lines of authority are
rigid and hierarchical, and where rules are hard and fast, and are made explicit
(i.e. strongly framed), whereas the children of the professional classes, particu-
larly in the Post-Fordist West, are invited to enter debate and open exploration
of feelings, rules, and opinions, so are more at ease in weakly framed situations
(such as when a teacher simply tells pupils to “find out about” something).
Bernstein’s key insight in the context of the present debate is that children ex-
perience educational events differently according to their backgrounds and prior
experiences — and teachers should take this into account. To misquote Tony
Blair on schools in England and Wales, in word if not in spirit: “One size should
not fit all.” This serves as a reminder to environmental educators, for example,
that the same experience will not always be interpreted in the same way or
produce the same result; the teacher’s frames will not always match those of
the taught.
Taken together, what do these formulations imply about frames of mind? Per-
haps:
(i) they organize, and/or determine and constrain thinking. We see
the world from within them, not outside them;
(ii) yet we do have some metacognitive, aesthetic, or deconstructive
capacity to recognize frames, if not from the outside, at least from
other frames. Also, our frames can be at least shaken by experience
(cf. Kant’s views on the Sublime in the Critique of Judgment). Also,
either frames change, or our uses of them or operations within them
change;
(iii)what we cannot do is ever fully articulate the relationship of our
frames to the material conditions prior to their development. My
ways of seeing the world, which cannot be entirely separate from
yours (as Wittgenstein argued at some length in the section of Philo-
sophical Investigations devoted to the impossibility of a private lan-
guage), nevertheless retain an essentially arbitrary relationship to
biophysical reality, in the sense that we cannot understand the de-
gree to which our cultural options are constrained by material reality
any more than we can understand why a dog is called a dog or a
hund or a chien. This is true even of Kant’s use of the Category. (An
interesting corollary of this is that if intelligent life has developed on
other planets, there seems little reason to believe that we should be
able to communicate with it, as there is no compelling argument
that the same material conditions would produce identical frames
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of mind, let alone identical strategic and tactical judgments within
them. Even if material reality can be explained mathematically,
there is no reason to suppose that mathematical languages would be
replicated. Contexts for action never completely replicate.)
I would argue that we tend to see sustainability in terms of the basic Category of
cause and effect: modern industrial practices have been the cause; environmental
and social degradation are the result; sustainability is the answer. To put it
differently, sustainability as a regulative ideal is a product of the dialogue that
produced the current sense of environmental and ecological crisis. Given a broad
acceptance of this, however, sustainability dialogue is riddled with assumptions
that do not really add up. Harre´, Brockmeier, and Muhlhausler5 have shown
clearly in Greenspeak, for example, how environmentalist rhetoric has cleverly
combined palaeontological, cultural, and personal timeframes to create a sense
of imminent disaster.
Given these paradoxes, and conflicting views about both frames of mind and sus-
tainability, where might we look to develop new orientations to action, whether
or not these amount to frames of mind according to the various definitions
above? These possibilities occur:
(i) in the postmodern science advocated by Aran Gare and others,6
influenced by Jean-Francois Lyotard’s rejection of scientific progress
as anything more, or less, than a narrative, and not one that can
override all others,7 or
(ii) in some kind of spiritual, deep ecological movement, involving
perhaps a revival of Hegelian idealism, thoroughgoing Romanticism,
or religious, mystical and quasi-mystical discourses and practices of
transcendence and renunciation.
Certain features could be said to be common to each of these, differentiating each
from the mainstream of Western modernist thought: a sense of interrelationship;
a love of the intangible Other; a delight in the unknown and the unknowable (yet
perceivable, under the right circumstances); a belief that the whole is greater
than the part will ever apprehend (including the human reason part), so an
acceptance of both our power to be at one with nature and the healthy limitation
of our powers; and a belief that there may be no ultimate technological answer,
including no ultimate recipe for sustainability.
I have argued elsewhere that scientific and critical realist readings of the en-
vironmental crisis tend to lack one or more of these crucial ingredients.8 The
modernist obsession with control over both nature and society, though it has
brought us many benefits, has, for example, tended to blind us to the fact that
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many of our most fulfilling experiences are encounters with the non-human, of-
ten when we are alone. A few weeks ago, I sat on a stile in a Wiltshire field and
watched a fox as it approached me, stopped and looked at me while I looked at
it, and we mutually failed to understand each other. A little later, I spent even
longer observing gorillas in a zoo. (The very existence of zoos raises questions
about environmental learning, of course.) We remember such things, I would
suggest, because they disrupt, or make us question, or make us somehow aware
of, our frames and remind us that there is always life beyond the narrow lim-
its of our reason: life to which we are related in some way, though we cannot
understand it. We are reminded, as Shakespeare wrote, that there is more in
heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophies. Some experiences can
rattle our frames.
So a sustainable world may be one that continues to contain more than we can
understand. To bring about sustainability, thus defined, we have to leave open
the possibilities for surprise and wonder by reminding ourselves that the real
riches of living lie in the world beyond that which we control. Life can be perfect
(cf. Kant’s idea of the Beautiful) and awe-inspiring (the Sublime). Whether we
can actually guarantee keeping a balance in what we cannot understand or
control is a moot question, though we can certainly try to keep a balance within
ourselves.
How can we pursue knowledge in pursuit of the unknowable? Only, I would
suggest (and this makes no pretence at an original answer), by acknowledging
some force, a mind, greater than our own, individually, collectively, or histori-
cally. While scientific modernity, encouraged perhaps by Kant, may tend to see
people as moral agents within a mechanical universe, perhaps a healthy reversal
is due. We might rather conceive of much of ourselves, much of the time, as
mechanical agents within a mysteriously purposeful universe: little technicians
who have often lost sight of our significant insignificance in the greater scheme
of things that will always, in its entirety, remain closed to us. Thus understood,
we are trapped within frames of mind, or patterns of judgment, dictated by a
rather reductionist rationalism and impoverished empiricism, but by opening
ourselves up to new experience we can reawaken our sense of wonder and of
place, if not ever fully know what we’re here for, or guarantee our sustainabil-
ity. The path through the maize field to the stile where I saw the fox is there
for all to follow; like all footpaths, it was once the obvious way from A to B.
Now there is no point in following it unless you have a dog to walk, or you
want to experience that sense of something more or different that comes from
following the way less travelled. Both were true in my case. Although it was
only a field, and therefore, a pretty strongly humanly controlled environment, it
was redolent of the mystery of growth and decay that, presumably, we all wish
to sustain; I went there to be reminded of more than I had in my mind, and
was not disappointed.
And what of the pedagogical implications? On the one hand, our students need
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to understand our ways of doing things as modernist technophiles as much as
ever. To function in the modern world requires an education in its ways, and
formal education, via schooling, is inevitably largely a conservative process of
induction into a culture and its frames. Although frames, as cultural constructs,
might change over time, we cannot fully control this process: we cannot simply
replace our ways of knowing or our ways of getting to know, either with some
new sustainable model, or some pick-and-mix from the more attractive offerings
of premodern cultures. The challenge, therefore, becomes to encourage more
than what we have been doing, not to pretend to do without it. And where
can this added value (for this is real added value) come from? While religious
experience has been cited, it is important not to suppose that religious education
generally provides this. Often, religious education is received by students as yet
another package of facts, and not a very useful one at that. In such cases our
teaching is not misguided but is insufficient, not amounting to enough, in many
cases, to enrich personal existence through exposing students to their limits and
to the mysteries of the world beyond them, even where that may be its espoused
intention. However, we are far from incapable of such experience, even in the
urban context. Fiction and poetry can do this, as can music and the other arts;
contact with animals can do it (particularly, but not solely, in their natural
habitats); as can some experiences at the edge of safety and security, including
the kind of outdoor pursuit that has become increasingly rare in British schools
in an increasingly regulated and litigious climate; sometimes, even science and
languages and history in the classroom can do it, perhaps most often for those
students rendered susceptible to their mysteries through influences beyond the
school. Certain kinds of sense-making are both exploratory and enriching, and
resist easy closure.
In conclusion, therefore, education for sustainability as a frame of mind, or to-
wards sustainability as a condition of the planet, might take the view that it
remains important to learn languages and sciences and history — but that these
should be learnt as much as possible as adventures towards encounters with the
unknown, and that students might have some other adventures, too, whether in
or out of school, so that, even in education, the experience can exceed the expec-
tations, whether or not the frames are changed (because the latter depends on
how we conceive of frames of mind). Let the educational quest always be for the
unknowable. How else can coming generations learn to live in awe of life? The
twentieth century has been characterised as the century of the attempted exter-
mination of the Other by the exploitation of frighteningly powerful technologies,
and we continue to suffer the aftershocks. Alain Finkielkraut,8 for example, cites
both Stalinism and Nazism as the excesses of a coldly instrumental rationality
that demonized difference in the pursuit (quite sincere, in their own terms) of
Utopia. It would, I fear, be quite possible to demonize difference in pursuit of a
sustainable society, based on principles of scientific ecology. Perhaps almost as
uncomfortably, Finkielkraut sees the Millennial postmodern condition as also
retreating from encounters with the Other, but this time through a failure to
respect any ties, ideologies, traditions, or arguments, so that all human living
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on Earth is conducted from the superficial perspective of the tourist. Recent
events have reminded us just how paper-thin the veneer of mutual tolerance
can be. Finkielkraut concludes In The Name of Humanity by quoting Hannah
Arendt, who considered resentment the natural, and understandable, condition
of post-Holocaust humanity, and gratitude as its only feasible alternative. What
price an education that makes us grateful for life on Earth?
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